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THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
seems to indicate a more liberal view toward validating life insurance
policies.' 3 A possible relaxation of the "partnership view" may per-
haps be found in the construction of incontestable clauses.14
A. K. SMITH,
CHARLES S. MANGUM, JR.
Master and Servant-Liability for Injury to Invitee
of Truck Driver
Is a truck owner liable for injuries to a boy who, invited to
ride on the running board by the driver without authority, was
injured when he was thrown off as the truck rounded a corner at
a rapid rate? The court held that the driver exceeded the scope
of his employment in inviting the boy to ride.' A similar result was
reached in another case when the secretary-treasurer of a company
invited plaintiff's intestate to ride in a company car which was
wrecked at a street intersection.2 No evidence was introduced to
show that the secretary was given to the habit of carrying passengers
without authorization. Had this been established, defendant com-
pany might have been charged with constructive notice of violation
of its rule and hence, with its abrogation.8
It is generally conceded that a servant has no implied authority
"In Hardy v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 152 N. C. 286, 67 S. E. 767 (1910),
after a thorough review of Trinity College v. Ins. Co., supra note 12, Powell
v. Dewey, supra note 10, Burbage v. Windley's Ex'rs., 108 N. C. 351, 128 S. E.
839, 12 L. R. A. 409 (1891), Hinton v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n, 135
N. C. 314, 47 S. E. 474, 65 L. R. A. 161 (1904), it was decided that, although
prior North Carolina cases seemed to refuse to allow the good faith assign-
ment of life insurance to persons having no insurable interest, an assignment
would be valid where it was not a cloak to a wagering contract or transaction.
In American Trust Co. v. Life Ins. Co. of Va. supra note 7, the validity of
N. C. Cons. Stat. Ann. (1919) §1126 (5) 'passed as a result of Victor v.
Louise Mills, 148 N. C. 107, 61 S. E. 648 (1908)] giving every corporation an
insurable interest in the life of any officer or agent whose death would cause
financial loss to the corporation, was recognized.
"
4 In American Trust Co. Life Ins. Co. of Va., 173 N. C. 558, 560, 92 S. E.
706, 709 (1917), there is the following dictum: "There is authority for the
position that the incontestable clause in a policy of insurance covers every
defense except that there was no insurable interest at the time of issuing the
policy (5 Elliott on Contracts, §4077), although the trend of modern authority
is that the clause, when it takes effect within a reasonable time after the issue
of the -policy and not from the date, cuts off all defenses except those specially
allowed by the clause itself."
I Cotton v. Carolina Truck Co.. 197 N. C. 709, 150 S. E. 505 (1929).
'Collar v. Grocery Co., 150 S. E. 2 (W. Va. 1929).
'Hammond v. Coal Co., 105 W. Va. 423, 143 S. E. 91 (1928).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
to invite or permit a third person to ride on the master's vehicle.4
And when the driver has so exceeded his authority or violated his
express instructions, the invitee of the driver is in no better case as
regards the master than a trespasser.5 The master owes no duty to
the trespasser except to refrain from wilfully or wantonly injuring
him.0 On the other hand, it has been held that the trespasser is not
deprived of all recourse against the master even in case of a negligent
injury.7 The owner of a motor truck or car is not bound to keep
a lookout for trespassers, nor to maintain his car in a reasonably safe
condition for them. But independent of the authority granted to the
driver, the duty to avoid injuring one whose presence and peril are
known is so imperative that it must apply even to trespassers. Thus
the driver, by his knowledge of the situation of the person he has
invited, places the master in the position of owing to the known tres-
passer ordinary care.8 Although the master is not required to exer-
cise the same degree of care as where permission is authorized
ostensibly,9 he is liable for a reckless injury by the servant who is
otherwise engaged about his master's business.10 A reckless injury
may mean "careless, inattentive, negligent, or desperately heedless."1 1
In Higbee Co. v. Jackson,1 2 the court even went so far as to say,
"this auto truck was placed in the hands of the driver, making him
conclusively the company's agent, not only in the use, but also in the
abuse, of the right to public safety on the part of the travelling pub-
lic, either on or off the truck."
'Dover v. Mayes Mfg. Co., 157 N. C. 324, 72 S. E. 1067 (1911); Christie
v. Mitchell, 93 W. Va. 200, 116 S. E. 715 (1923).
Rolfe v. Hewitt, 227 N. Y. 486, 125 N. E. 804 (1920); Hughes v. Mur-
doch Co., 269 Pa. 222, 112 Atl. 111 (1920).Nelson v. Traction Co., 276 Pa. 178, 119 Atl. 918 (1923).
'Fry v. Southern Pub. Util. Co., 183 N. C. 281, 111 S. E. 354 (1922)
(Driver knew of perilous position of boy and recklessly exposed him to
danger).
'Kalmich v. White, 95 Conn. 568, 111 AtI. 845 (1920); Aiken v. Holyoke
St. Ry. Co., 184 Mass. 269, 68 N. E. 238 (1903).
'Purple v. U. P. Ry. Co., 114 Fed. 123 (C. C. A. 8th, 1902).
"' Smith Bros. v. Williams, 294 S. W. 309 (Texarkana Civ. App. 1927).
But suppose driver deviates from employment? Depends on degree of devi-
ation. Healey v. Cockrill, 133 Ark. 327, 202 S. W. 229 (1918) ; Drakenburg
v. Knight, 178 Wis. 386, 190 N. W. 119 (1922); Cummings v. Truck Co., 241
Mass. 292, 135 N. E. 134 (1922).
'Short v. Kaltman, 192 N. C. 154, 134 S. E. 425 (1926); Heidenreich v.
Bremner, 260 II. 439, 103 N. E. 275 (1913).
"101 Ohio St. 75, 128 N. E. 61 (1920). Accord: La Rose v. Shaughnessy
Ice Co., 197 App. Div. 821, 189 N. Y. Supp. 562 (1921) ; Murphy v. Ross, 2 Ir.
R. 199 (1920); Grabau v. Pudwill, 45 N. D. 423, 178 N. W. 124 (1920).
Contra: Goldberg v. Borden's Co., 227 N. Y. 465, 125 N. E. 807 (1920);
Schulwitz v. Delta Lumber Co., 126 Mich. 559, 85 N. W. 1075 (1901).
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Such an unauthorized invitee has been considered as a fellow
servant of the driver and recovery barred, where the invitee gratui-
tously assisted in unloading the truck.'3 But upon very similar facts
the same court one year later decided that the relation had been
terminated and permitted a recovery.14
Most of these cases which granted a recovery were concerned
with infant plaintiffs whose ignorance of danger and actual peril are
facts known to the driver, whose knowledge may be imputed to the
master.' 5 Indeed, these representatives of the minority view 1 have
been criticised as questionably combining the doctrine of "dangerous
machinery"' 7 with that of "attractive nuisance," where neither
existed.' 8
Recently there has been a tendency on the part of the legislatures
to break away from the rigid limitation of the rules of liability of
the owner of an automobile. Thus, in some states, this tendency has
been embodied in statutes providing that every owner of an auto-
mobile operated upon the public highway shall be liable for injuries
resulting from negligence in operation of such motor vehicle in the
business of the owner or otherwise, by any person legally using or
operating it with the permission, express or implied, of the owner.10
Two states have modified this liability to the effect that the owner is
not necessarily liable for damages beyond the value of the car, when
any other person is operating it, although such damages constitute a
lien upon the car.20
In the instant case it is suggested that in the light of the decisions
and in consideration of the age of the plaintiff (eleven years) that the
court might have been justified in arriving at a different conclusion.
C. E. REITZEL.
Gunderson v. Eastern Brewing Co., 71 Misc. 519, 130 N. Y. Supp. 785
(1911).
' Nudelman v. Borden's Co., 77 Misc. 103, 136 N. Y. Supp. 49 (1912).
"M Morris v. Peyton, 149 Va. 318, 139 S. E. 500 (1927).
"
0Note (1920) 14 A. L. R. 145.
" Horack, The Dangerous Instrument Doctrine (1917) 26 YALE L. J. 224.
8 (1928) 6 N. C. L. REv. 338.
"lMich. Pub. Acts (1909) No. 318. (Amended so owner not liable when car
driven without his knowledge or consent. Mich. Comp. Laws [Cahill, 1915]
§4825.) Acts 38th Gen. Assem. of Iowa, ch. 275, §12. Conn. Gen. Stat, (1918)
§1572, (bailor liable for injury resulting from negligence of bailee). Re-
pealed-Conn. Pub. Acts (1921) ch. 334. Cal. Gen. Laws (1919) p. 223, §14
(person signing for minor's license to drive is liable for mTnor's negligence),
Laws of N. Y. (1928) ch. 508, p. 1092. (Amended to exclude lessors of auto-
mobiles who carry public liability insurance.)
S. C. Gen. Laws (1915) (27 St. at Large, p. 737) §1. Tenn. Gen. Laws(1905) ch. 173, §5.
